Formal Verification Techniques for Implementing Post-quantum Cryptography Falcon
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    Abstract:

    Falcon, a post-quantum digital signature algorithm, has been selected as one of the first schemes standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Its core algorithms, however, are highly error-prone in practical implementations, raising risks of cryptographic misuse. Ensuring the correctness of Falcon through formal verification is therefore essential. In this work, this study introduces a comprehensive proof framework that bridges the gap between Falcon’s mathematical specification and its real-world implementation. Within the EasyCrypt proof system, this study formally verifies the correctness of Falcon’s Montgomery modular multiplication, NTT, and FFT algorithms, and further explores proof techniques for integer Gaussian sampling. Moreover, this study presents and optimizes Falcon’s signing and verification implementations using Jasmin hybrid programming, thereby providing both formal correctness guarantees and practical efficiency.

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田新蕾,董奕逸,张济显,王伟嘉.后量子密码Falcon实现的形式化验证技术.软件学报,2025,36(11):4990-5007

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History
  • Received:July 25,2024
  • Revised:October 08,2024
  • Adopted:
  • Online: August 20,2025
  • Published: November 06,2025
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