| 引用本文: | 邹剑,邹宏楷,董晓阳,吴文玲,罗宜元.基于周期性质的新型密钥恢复攻击方法.软件学报,2023,34(9):4239-4255 |
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| 基于周期性质的新型密钥恢复攻击方法 |
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邹剑1,2, 邹宏楷1,2, 董晓阳3, 吴文玲4, 罗宜元5
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1.福州大学 计算机与大数据学院, 福建 福州 350108;2.网络系统信息安全福建省高校重点实验室(福州大学), 福建 福州 350108;3.清华大学 高等研究院, 北京 100190;4.中国科学院 软件研究所 可信计算与信息保障实验室, 北京100190;5.惠州学院 信息科学技术学院, 广东 惠州 516007
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| 摘要: |
| 针对Feistel, Misty与Type-1/2型广义Feistel等结构, 创新性地将Simon算法的周期性质与生日攻击思想相结合, 提出一种新型传统密钥恢复攻击. 与Simon算法可以在多项式时间内恢复周期值不同, 在传统计算环境下至少需要生日攻击界才能恢复出对应的周期值. 利用所提方法, 可以在${\rm{O}}({2^{n/4}})$的选择明文和密文条件下, 以${\rm{O}}({2^{3n/4}})$的时间复杂度恢复出5轮Feistel-F结构的密钥, 对应的存储复杂度为${\rm{O}}({2^{n/4}})$. 上述结果比Isobe和Shibutani的工作结果多扩展1轮, 并且所需的存储复杂度也更少. 对于Feistel-FK结构, 构造7轮密钥恢复攻击. 此外, 还将上述方法应用于构造Misty结构和Type-1/2型广义Feistel结构的密钥恢复攻击. 对于不同的Misty密码方案, 分别给出5轮Misty L-F和Misty R-F结构的密钥恢复攻击, 以及6轮Misty L-KF/FK和Misty R-KF/FK结构的密钥恢复攻击. 对于$d$分支Type-1型广义Feistel结构, 给出${d^2}$轮的密钥恢复攻击. 当d≥6时, 对于d分支Type-2型广义Feistel结构的新型密钥恢复攻击轮数会优于现有密钥恢复攻击轮数. |
| 关键词: Feistel Misty Type-1/2型广义Feistel结构 密钥恢复攻击 Simon算法 周期性质 生日攻击 |
| DOI：10.13328/j.cnki.jos.006636 |
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| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61902073, 62072445, 62072207, 62072109, U1804263); 福建省自然科学基金(2021J01623, 2021J06013) |
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| New Key Recovery Attack Based on Periodic Property |
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ZOU Jian1,2, ZOU Hong-Kai1,2, DONG Xiao-Yang3, WU Wen-Ling4, LUO Yi-Yuan5
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1.College of Computer and Data Science, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China;2.Key Lab of Information Security of Network Systems (Fuzhou University), Fuzhou 350108, China;3.Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100190, China;4.Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;5.School of Information Sciences and Technology, Huizhou University, Huizhou 516007, China
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| Abstract: |
| This study proposes a new classical key recovery attack against schemes such as Feistel, Misty, and Type-1/2 generalized Feistel schemes (GFS), which creatively combines the birthday attack with the periodic property of Simon’s algorithm. Although Simon’s algorithm can recover the periodic value in polynomial time, this study requires the birthday bound to recover the corresponding periodic value in the classical setting. By this new attack, the key to a 5-round Feistel-F scheme can be recovered with the time complexity of O(23n/4) under the chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts of O(2n/4), and the corresponding memory complexity is O(2n/4). Compared with the results of Isobe and Shibutani, the above result not only increases one round but also requires lower memory complexity. For the Feistel-FK scheme, a 7-round key recovery attack is constructed. In addition, the above approach is applied to construct the key recovery attacks against Misty schemes and Type-1/2 GFS. Specifically, the key recovery attacks against the 5-round Misty L-F and Misty R-F schemes and those against the 6-round Misty L-KF/FK and Misty R-KF/FK schemes are given; for the d-branch Type-1 GFS, a d2-round key recovery attack is presented, and when d≥6, the number of rounds of the key recovery attack is superior to those of the existing key recovery attacks. |
| Key words: Feistel Misty Type-1/2 GFS key recovery attack Simon’s algorithm periodic property birthday attack |
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