| 摘要: |
| 互联网、物联网和大数据的迅速发展，为数据共享带来了无限的机遇，也给私有数据的隐私保护带来了严峻的挑战.安全多方计算是数据共享中隐私保护的关键技术，是密码学的一个重要研究方向，也是国际密码学界研究的热点.保密比较两个数的大小是安全多方计算的一个基本问题，是构建其他隐私保护协议的一个基本模块.当比较的数较小时，还没有可靠的能够抵抗主动攻击的保密比较问题解决方案.很多应用场景中的参与者可能会发动主动攻击，因为尚没有抗主动攻击的保密比较协议，这些场景中的保密比较问题还无法解决.因而研究抗主动攻击的保密比较问题解决方案有重要理论与实际意义.提出了一种加密-选择安全多方计算模式和编码+保密洗牌证明的抵抗主动攻击方法.在此基础上，设计了半诚实模型下安全的保密比较协议，用模拟范例证明了协议的安全性；分析了恶意参与者可能实施的主动攻击，结合ElGamal密码系统的乘法同态性、离散对数与保密洗牌的零知识证明设计阻止恶意行为的措施，将半诚实模型下安全的保密比较协议改造成抗主动攻击的保密比较协议，并用理想-实际范例证明了协议的安全性.最后分析了协议的效率，并通过实验验证协议是可行的. |
| 关键词: 安全多方计算 保密比较 主动攻击 模拟范例 理想-实际范例 保密洗牌 零知识证明 |
| DOI：10.13328/j.cnki.jos.006361 |
| 分类号:TP306 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金（61272435） |
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| Comparing Protocol Against Active Attacks |
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LI Shun-Dong1, WANG Wen-Li1, CHEN Ming-Yan2, WANG Yu-Lin2
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1.School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710119, China;2.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710119, China
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| Abstract: |
| The rapid development of the Internet, IOT, and big data brings great chance to share data owned by different entities, but it also brings severe challenge to privacy-preserving of private data. Secure multiparty computation is a key privacy-preserving technology, an important field of cryptography, and a focus of international cryptographic community. Privately comparing two numbers is a basic problem of secure multiparty computation. The protocols for this problem are building blocks to construct other privacy-preserving protocols. If the two numbers to be compared is small, there is no reliable solution to this problem that can resist active attacks. In many scenarios, the participants may be malicious and they may actively attack a protocol. If this is the case, there is no solution that can be used to privately compare the numbers. Therefore, it is of important theoretical and practical significance to design a protocol that can resist active attacks. This study first proposes a new technique called encrypt-and-choose and a new technology to resist active attacks:encoding+secure shuffle. Based on these techniques, a secure comparison protocol is first designed that is secure in the semi-honest model. Its security is proved by using the simulation paradigm. All possible active attacks are analyzed that the protocol may suffer from, and ElGamal multiplicative homomorphism and zero-knowledge proof of discrete logarithm and secure shuffle are used to resist possible active attacks. The protocol is then converted to one that can resist active attacks, and it is proved that it is secure against active attacks by using the ideal-real paradigm. Finally, the efficiency of the protocol is analyzed and tested. The experimental results demonstrate that the protocol is practical. |
| Key words: secure multiparty computation secure comparison active attack simulation paradigm ideal-real paradigm secure shuffle |
