| 摘要: |
| 分析了Midori-64算法在截断不可能差分攻击下的安全性.首先，通过分析Midori算法加、解密过程差分路径规律，证明了Midori算法在单密钥条件下的截断不可能差分区分器至多6轮，并对6轮截断不可能差分区分器进行了分类；其次，根据分类结果，构造了一个6轮区分器，并给出11轮Midori-64算法的不可能差分分析，恢复了128比特主密钥，其时间复杂度为2121.4，数据复杂度为260.8，存储复杂度为296.5. |
| 关键词: 密码分析 轻量级分组密码 Midori 不可能差分分析 截断不可能差分区分器 |
| DOI：10.13328/j.cnki.jos.005759 |
| 分类号:TP309 |
| 基金项目:信息保障技术重点实验室开放基金（KJ-17-003） |
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| Truncated Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Midori-64 |
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LI Ming-Ming, GUO Jian-Sheng, CUI Jing-Yi, XU Lin-Hong
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Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
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| Abstract: |
| The security of Midori-64 under truncated impossible differential cryptanalysis was studied. Firstly, by analyzing the differential paths of Midori in encryption and decryption direction, it was proved that the upper bound for the rounds of impossible differential distinguishers in single-key setting for Midori is 6. And the 6-round truncated impossible differential distinguisher was classified. Secondly, based on the classification, a 6-round distinguisher was constructed. At the same time the impossible differential attack on 11-round Midori-64 was given to recover the 128-bit master key with a time complexity of 2121.4 11-round encryptions, a data complexity of 260.8 chosen-plaintexts, and a memory complexity of 296.5 64-bit blocks. |
| Key words: cryptanalysis lightweight block cipher Midori impossible differential cryptanalysis truncated impossible differential distinguisher |
