| 本文已被：浏览 4077次 下载 9815次 |
码上扫一扫！ |
|
|
| 同态加密方案及安全两点直线计算协议 |
|
巩林明1,2, 李顺东2, 窦家维3, 郭奕旻2, 王道顺4
|
|
1.西安工程大学 计算机科学学院, 陕西 西安 710048;2.陕西师范大学 计算机科学学院, 陕西 西安 710062;3.陕西师范大学 数学与信息科学学院, 陕西 西安 710062;4.清华大学 计算机科学与技术系, 北京 100084
|
|
| 摘要: |
| 近年来，安全多方计算一直是密码领域的一个研究热点，保密几何计算是其一个重要分支.过两私有点坐标安全地计算一条直线问题，在空间信息安全方面有重要应用前景.首先，提出一个由加密方计算（或选取）加密底数的Paillier变体同态加密方案，并证明了其在标准模型下对适应性选择明文攻击（adaptive chosen-plaintext attack，简称CPA）是安全的；然后，在半诚实模型下，基于该变体同态加密方案设计了一个能够安全计算过两私有点直线的协议.还可以将此协议推广应用到可以归约为安全计算两私有点坐标差商的所有安全多方几何计算问题，从而解决了原有的基于同态加密体制的安全两方计算协议存在的信息泄露问题. |
| 关键词: 同态加密 安全多方计算 选择明文攻击 坐标差商 |
| DOI：10.13328/j.cnki.jos.005239 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金（61272435，61373020，U1536102） |
|
| Homomorphic Encryption Scheme and A Protocol on Secure Computing a Line by Two Private Points |
|
GONG Lin-Ming1,2, LI Shun-Dong2, DOU Jia-Wei3, GUO YI-Min2, WANG Dao-Shun4
|
|
1.School of Computer Science, Xi'an Polytechnic University, Xi'an 710048, China;2.School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, China;3.School of Mathematics and Information Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, China;4.Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
|
| Abstract: |
| In recent years, secure multiparty computation is one of research focuses in the field of cryptography, and secret geometry calculation is an important branch of it. The problem of safely calculating a straight line by two private coordinate point has important application prospect in space information security. First, a variant of Paillier's homomorphic encryption scheme is put forward in that the base is calculated by sender during encryption, and its indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-plaintext attack is proved. Then, based on this homomorphic encryption scheme, a protocol that can safely calculate a straight line by two private coordinate point in semi-honesty model is designed. Moreover, this protocol can be applied to solve a type of secure multiparty computational geometry problem that can be reduced to compute coordinate difference quotient. Thus, the problem that there is a non-negligible probability of private information leakage in the current coordinate difference quotient calculation protocols based on homomorphic encryption is solved. |
| Key words: homomorphic encryption multiparty secure computation chosen plaintext attack coordinate difference quotient |
