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| 一种认证密钥协商协议的安全分析及改进 |
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周永彬1,2, 张振峰1,2, 冯登国1,2
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1.中国科学院,软件研究所,北京,100080;2.信息安全国家重点实验室(中国科学院 软件研究所),北京,100080
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| 摘要: |
| 针对用于移动通信的可证安全的双向认证密钥协商协议MAKAP给出了一种有效攻击,指出该协议存在安全缺陷,它不能抵抗未知密钥共享攻击.分析了这些安全缺陷产生的原因,并给出了一种改进的协议MAKAP-I.改进后的MAKAP-I协议不但是可证安全的,而且无论从计算开销、通信开销、存储开销以及实现成本等方面,都比原MAKAP协议更高效、更实用. |
| 关键词: 认证密钥协商协议 未知密钥共享攻击 可证明安全性 |
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| 基金项目:Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.60503014, 60373039, 60273027, 90304007 (国家自然科学基金 |
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| Analysis and Improvement of a Security-Provable Mutually Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol |
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ZHOU Yong-Bin,ZHANG Zhen-Feng,FENG Deng-Guo
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| Abstract: |
| Deng, et al. proposed a security-provable mutually authenticated key agreement protocol MAKAP for mobile communication in 2003. This paper demonstrates by mounting an effective attack against MAKAP that the protocol has security flaws. It is vulnerable against unknown key-share attack. This paper investigates the reasons why such flaws exist and proposes an improved protocol version (called MAKAP-I protocol). The MAKAP-I protocol is not only provably secure within the random oracle model but also more efficient and practical in terms of computation and communication cost memory requirement and implementation cost, than the original MAKAP protocol. |
| Key words: authenticated key agreement protocol unknown key-share attack provable security |
