引用本文:张斌,伍宏军,冯登国,鲍丰.关于三个流密码的安全性.软件学报,2005,16(7):1344-1351
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关于三个流密码的安全性
张斌1, 伍宏军2, 冯登国1, 鲍丰2
1.信息安全国家重点实验室,中国科学院,研究生院,北京,100049;2.Institute for Infocomm Research, 119613, Singapore
摘要:
对3个新近提出的流密码S1,S2及S3进行了分析.这3个流密码被设计用于GSM网络加密,且分别对应于不同的安全性等级.结果表明,S1和S2都易受已知明文攻击,而S3不能正确解密.只需少量的密文字节和可以忽略的计算量就能够完全破解S1和S2.模拟实验结果表明,S3不能正确工作.结论是这3个流密码要么及其脆弱,要么就是不能正确解密,因此它们并不能在GSM网络安全方面扮演设计者所希望的角色.
关键词:  流密码  安全性  GSM网络  线性反馈移位寄存器  字节
DOI:
分类号:
基金项目:Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60273027 (国家自然科学基金); the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of China under Grant No.G1999035802 (国家重点基础研究发展规划(973)); the National Science Fund of China for Distinguished Young Scholars under Grant No.60025205 (国家杰出青年学者科学基金)
On the Security of Three Stream Ciphers
ZHANG Bin,WU Hong-Jun,FENG Deng-Guo,BAO Feng
Abstract:
In this paper three newly proposed stream ciphers S1, S2 and S3 are analyzed. These stream ciphers are designed with respect to different levels of GSM security. The results show that both S1 and S2 are vulnerable to the known plaintext attacks and S3 can not decrypt correctly. With negligible amount of computation and few known keystream bytes, S1 and S2 can be broken completely. Furthermore, simulation results show that S3 cannot work correctly. The conclusion is that these stream ciphers are either extremely weak or poorly designed so that they cannot play the role as the designers hope in GSM network security.
Key words:  stream cipher  security  GSM network  linear feedback shift register  bytes