Related-key Impossible Differential Attack on Piccolo
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TP309

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Open Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory (KJ-17-003)

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    Abstract:

    The existing security analysis results for Piccolo attack only up to 14-round Piccolo-80 and 18-round Piccolo-128 with lower complexity than exhaustive analysis, except for biclique analysis. By analyzing the information disclosure law of the key-schedule algorithm of Piccolo, the related-key impossible differential cryptanalysis method is used to give the attack results on 15-round Piccolo-80 and 21-round Piccolo-128 with pre-whitening keys respectively. When 28 related-keys are used, the data complexity of the attack is 258.6 and 262.3, the memory complexity is 260.6 and 264.3, and the computational complexity is 278 and 282.5 respectively. When 24 related-keys are used, the data complexity, memory complexity, and computational complexity of attack are 262.6, 262.3; 264.6, 264.3; 277.93, 2124.45 respectively. The analysis shows that the 15-round Piccolo-80 and 21-round Piccolo-128 with pre-whitening keys are insecure under the related-key impossible differential attack.

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徐林宏,郭建胜,崔竞一,李明明. Piccolo算法的相关密钥-不可能差分攻击.软件学报,2019,30(8):2349-2361

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History
  • Received:May 22,2018
  • Revised:September 21,2018
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  • Online: April 03,2019
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