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Journal of Software:2016.27(11):2898-2911

可证安全的抗泄露无证书混合签密机制
周彦伟,杨波,王青龙
(陕西师范大学 计算机科学学院, 陕西 西安 710062;信息安全国家重点实验室(中国科学院 信息工程研究所), 北京 100093;长安大学 信息工程学院, 陕西 西安 610064)
Provably Secure Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Hybrid Signcryption Scheme
ZHOU Yan-Wei,YANG Bo,WANG Qing-Long
(School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710062, China;State Key Laboratory of Information Security(Institute of Information Engineering, The Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China;School of Information Engineering, Chang'an University, Xi'an 710062, China)
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Received:June 27, 2015    Revised:September 10, 2015
> 中文摘要: 传统的基于双线性映射的混合签密方案存在着计算效率较低的不足,同时,无法抵抗信息泄露对方案所造成的危害,针对上述不足,在不使用双线性映射的基础上,提出了安全、高效的抗泄露无证书混合签密机制,并在随机谕言机模型下,基于计算性Diffie-Hellman问题和离散对数问题对该机制的机密性和不可伪造性进行了证明.同时,分析了该方案的公开验证性、前/后向安全性和不可否认性等安全属性;与传统的无证书混合签密机制相比,该机制不仅具有更优的计算效率,而且在秘密信息存在一定泄露的前提下,依然保持其所声称的安全性,即该方案还具有抵抗秘密信息泄露的能力.
Abstract:A hybrid signcryption scheme should withstand various leakage attacks when applied in practical applications. This paper presents a new leakage-resilient certificateless hybrid signcryption (LR-CLHS) scheme without bilinear pairing. The security of this scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption and discrete logarithm (DL) problem. Considering the computational costs, the proposal is more efficient than traditional certificateless hybrid signcryption schemes and has a short ciphertext length and high security. In the random oracle model, it is also indistinguishability against adaptive posteriori key-leakage chosenciphertext attacks (IND-KL-CCA2) according to the hardness of the CDH assumption, existentially unforgeable against key-leakage chosen-message attacks (EUF-KL-CMA) according to the hardness of the DL problem, and maintains the original security under the condition that the adversary learns a small amount of leakage about the secret key by the leakage attacks (e.g., side-channel attacks, etc).
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基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61572303,61272436);信息安全国家重点实验室(中国科学院信息工程研究所)开放课题(2015-MS-10);陕西省重点科技创新团队项目(2014KTC-18) 国家自然科学基金(61572303,61272436);信息安全国家重点实验室(中国科学院信息工程研究所)开放课题(2015-MS-10);陕西省重点科技创新团队项目(2014KTC-18)
Foundation items:National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572303, 61272436); Open Project of State Key Laboratory of Information Security (Institute of Information Engineering, The Chinese Academy of Sciences) (2015-MS-10); Program of Key Science and Technology Innovation Team in Shaanxi Province (2014KTC-18)
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周彦伟,杨波,王青龙.可证安全的抗泄露无证书混合签密机制.软件学报,2016,27(11):2898-2911

ZHOU Yan-Wei,YANG Bo,WANG Qing-Long.Provably Secure Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Hybrid Signcryption Scheme.Journal of Software,2016,27(11):2898-2911